In this book Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and
inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. Some of these authorities can be in the moral and
religious domains.
Why have people for thousands of years accepted epistemic authority in religious communities? A religious community's justification for authority is typically based on beliefs unique to that community. Unfortunately, that often means that from the community's perspective, its justifying claims are
insulated from the outside; whereas from an outside perspective, epistemic authority in the community appears unjustified. But as Zagzebski's argument shows, an individual's acceptance of authority in her community can be justified by principles that outsiders accept, and the particular beliefs
justified by that authority are not immune to external critiques.

lgrsnf/Epistemic Authority_.pdf

lgli/Epistemic Authority_.pdf

Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus

Oxford Institute for Energy Studies

German Historical Institute London

Oxford University Press USA, New York, 2015

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

New York, New York State, 2012

Oxford, ©2012

{"edition":"1","isbns":["0199936471","9780199936472"],"last_page":304,"publisher":"Oxford University Press"}

Gives An Extended Argument For Epistemic Authority From The Implications Of Reflective Self-consciousness. Epistemic Authority Is Compatible With Autonomy, But Epistemic Self-reliance Is Incoherent. The Book Argues That Epistemic And Emotional Self-trust Are Rational And Inescapable, That Consistent Self-trust Commits Us To Trust In Others, And That Among Those We Are Committed To Trusting Are Some Whom We Ought To Treat As Epistemic Authorities, Modelled On The Well-known Principles Of Authority Of Joseph Raz. Some Of These Authorities Can Be In The Moral And Religious Domains. The Book Investigates The Way The Problem Of Disagreement Between Communities Or Between The Self And Others Is A Conflict Within Self-trust, And Argue Against Communal Self-reliance On The Same Grounds As The Book Uses In Arguing Against Individual Self-reliance. The Book Explains How Any Change In Belief Is Justified--by The Conscientious Judgment That The Change Will Survive Future Conscientious Self-reflection. The Book Concludes With An Account Of Autonomy. --publisher's Description. The Rejection Of Epistemic Authority -- Epistemic Self-trust -- Epistemic Trust In Others -- Trust In Emotions -- Trust And Epistemic Authority -- The Authority Of Testimony -- Epistemic Authority In Communities -- Moral Authority -- Religious Authority -- Trust And Disagreement -- Autonomy. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Includes Bibliographical References [255]-268) And Indexes.

In this book Zagzebski gives an extended argument that the self-reflective person is committed to belief on authority. Epistemic authority is compatible with autonomy, but epistemic self-reliance is incoherent. She argues that epistemic and emotional self-trust are rational and inescapable, that consistent self-trust commits us to trust in others, and that among those we are committed to trusting are some whom we ought to treat as epistemic authorities, modeled on the well-known principles of authority of Joseph Raz. These principles apply to authority in the moral and religious domains

2022-02-12