why Do Some Authoritarian Regimes Topple During Financial Crises, While Others Steer Through Financial Crises Relatively Unscathed? In This Book, Thomas B. Pepinsky Uses The Experiences Of Indonesia And Malaysia And The Analytical Tools Of Open Economy Macroeconomics To Answer This Question. Focusing On The Economic Interests Of Authoritarian Regimes' Supporters, Pepinsky Shows That Differences In Cross-border Asset Specificity Produce Dramatically Different Outcomes In Regimes Facing Financial Crises. When Asset Specificity Divides Supporters, As In Indonesia, They Desire Mutually Incompatible Adjustment Policies, Yielding Incoherent Adjustment Policy Followed By Regime Collapse. When Coalitions Are Not Divided By Asset Specificity, As In Malaysia, Regimes Adopt Radical Adjustment Measures That Enable Them To Survive Financial Crises. Combining Rich Qualitative Evidence From Southeast Asia With Cross-national Time-series Data And Comparative Case Studies Of Latin American Autocracies, Pepinsky Reveals The Power Of Coalitions And Capital Mobility To Explain How Financial Crises Produce Regime Change.

Pepinsky, Thomas B.

Greenwich Medical Media Ltd

Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, 2009

United Kingdom and Ireland, United Kingdom

New York, NY, New York State, 2009

2010

до 2011-01

lg590533

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Includes bibliographical references and index.

Half-title......Page 3
Title......Page 5
Copyright......Page 6
Dedication......Page 7
Contents......Page 9
List of Tables......Page 11
List of Figures......Page 13
Acknowledgments......Page 15
Terms and Abbreviations......Page 17
Two Countries, Two Trajectories......Page 21
Understanding Adjustment and Authoritarian Breakdowns......Page 24
Data and Methods......Page 29
The Plan of the Book......Page 31
2 Coalitional Sources of Adjustment and Regime Survival......Page 34
The Reform Game......Page 36
Financial Crises and the Problem of Adjustment......Page 40
Solutions......Page 42
Players and Policies......Page 44
Predictions......Page 50
The Global Scope of the Argument......Page 52
Conclusion......Page 55
Appendix......Page 56
3 Authoritarian Support Coalitions: Comparing Indonesia and Malaysia......Page 60
The New Order......Page 62
Fixed Capital: ABRI and the Pribumi Entrepreneurs......Page 65
Mobile Capital: The Konglomerat......Page 73
Mahathir’s Malaysia......Page 81
The Malay Masses......Page 84
Fixed Capital: New Malay Entrepreneurs......Page 89
Discussion: Alternative Models of Authoritarian Politics......Page 97
4 Adjustment Policy in Indonesia, June 1997–May 1998......Page 102
Crisis Onset......Page 105
Fiscal and Trade Policy......Page 107
Monetary Policy......Page 111
Finance and Corporate Policy......Page 114
Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy......Page 125
Alternative Explanations?......Page 135
5 Adjustment Policy in Malaysia, June 1997–December 1999......Page 139
Crisis Onset......Page 141
Fiscal and Trade Policy......Page 144
Monetary Policy......Page 150
Finance and Corporate Policy......Page 153
Exchange Rate and Capital Account Policy......Page 163
Alternative Explanations?......Page 172
6 Authoritarian Breakdown in Indonesia......Page 175
Ex Ante Unlikely, Ex Post Inevitable......Page 176
Legitimacy......Page 177
Massive Groundswell of Discontent......Page 179
Irrationality......Page 181
Structural Contradictions......Page 182
Late New Order Politics......Page 186
From Economic to Political Crisis......Page 188
The Konglomerat and Chinese Indonesians......Page 192
Final Months of Regime Unity......Page 196
Riots, Exit, and Endgame......Page 200
Conclusion......Page 205
Postscript: From Authoritarian Breakdown to Democratization......Page 207
7 Authoritarian Stability in Malaysia......Page 212
‘‘The Tragedy That Didn’t Happen’’......Page 213
Mild Crisis......Page 214
Mahathirism versus Anarchy......Page 215
The Party System......Page 216
Successful Adjustment......Page 217
Mahathir’s Malaysia in 1997......Page 218
From Economic to Political Crisis......Page 220
Anwar versus Mahathir......Page 222
Containing Domestic Opposition......Page 224
International Retreat and Domestic Offensive......Page 230
Capital Controls and Crackdown......Page 231
The 1999 General Elections......Page 236
Conclusion......Page 242
8 Cross-National Perspectives......Page 245
Capital Account Restrictions and Regime Survival......Page 246
Chile, 1981–1985......Page 258
Argentina, 1981–1983......Page 263
Uruguay, 1981–1985......Page 268
Mexico: 1980s and 1990s......Page 270
The Latin American Debt Crisis in Mexico......Page 271
From Orthodoxy to the Tequila Crisis to Authoritarian Breakdown......Page 275
Conclusion: Cross-National Perspectives on Crises, Coalitions, and Change......Page 280
9 Conclusions......Page 284
Theories of Authoritarianism......Page 286
Open Economy Politics......Page 289
Authoritarian Breakdowns......Page 291
Normative Implications......Page 294
References......Page 299
Index......Page 333

Crises, Adjustment, And Transitions -- Coalitional Sources Of Adjustment And Regime Survival -- Authoritarian Support Coalitions : Comparing Indonesia And Malaysia -- Adjustment Policy In Indonesia, June 1997-may 1998 -- Adjustment Policy In Malaysia, June 1997-december 1999 -- Authoritarian Breakdown In Indonesia -- Authoritarian Stability In Malaysia -- Cross-national Perspectives -- Conclusions. Thomas B. Pepinsky. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 279-311) And Index.

Thomas B. Pepinsky examines how coalitions and capital mobility in Indonesia and Malaysia shape the links between financial crises and regime change.--Résumé de l'éditeur

2011-06-04